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Commercial Transportation: A
Two-Year Survey
by Madeline E. McNeeley*
Yvonne S. Godfrey**
T. Peyton Bell***
and Stephen G. Lowry****
I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial transportation involves all of the significant forms of
passenger and freight transportation across the United States. This
Article surveys significant judicial and legislative developments in
Georgia commercial-transportation law during the period from June 1,
2017 through May 31, 2019.1
Three of the areas discussed here—commercial motor vehicles,
aviation, and rail—are subject to heavy federal regulation due to their
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1. This Article covers an expanded survey period because no survey on this topic
appeared in the seventieth volume of the Mercer Law Review. For an analysis of
commercial-transportation law from the previous survey period, see Stephen G. Lowry et
al., Commercial Transportation, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 69 MERCER L. REV. 41
(2017).
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large effects on interstate commerce. Accordingly, motor-carrier and
railroad law primarily saw developments pertaining to state procedure
and in the interactions between state and federal law, while state
aviation law primarily focused on Georgia’s efforts both to regulate and
facilitate the development of unmanned aircraft and commercial space
flight. This Article also discusses the nascent industry in “last mile”
rentals of shareable dockless electric scooters and electric bicycles.
These businesses have exploded onto the scene just in the last two or
three years and have sent local and state lawmakers rushing to address
the issues they present. Finally, this Article concludes with a brief
section on two more areas being “disrupted” by Silicon Valley
entrepreneurs: passenger transportation for hire, which saw a useful
appellate opinion on when an individual’s automobile insurance may
stop applying to trips with paying passengers, and autonomous-vehicle
technology.
II. TRUCKING AND COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLES
A. Venue for Motor Carrier Litigation
In Blakemore v. Dirt Movers, Inc.,2 the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered the competing venue provisions under the Georgia Business
Corporation Code, O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b),3 and the Georgia Motor
Carrier Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-1-117(b).4 In an action against a
motor-carrier defendant, the Georgia Motor Carrier Act makes venue
proper in the county where the tort occurred.5 Pursuant to the Georgia
Business Corporation Code, venue in a tort action against a domestic
corporate defendant likewise is proper where the tort occurred, but if
the defendant does not have an office in that county, it has the right to
remove the action to the county where it maintains its principal place of
business.6
In Blakemore, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Dirt
Movers, Dirt Movers’s driver, and Dirt Movers’s liability insurance
carrier in Bibb County State Court following the death of the plaintiff’s
daughter in a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Bibb County. All
parties agreed that Dirt Movers was a Georgia corporation registered
with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration that maintained
its principal place of business and registered agent in Jeff Davis
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

344 Ga. App. 238, 809 S.E.2d 827 (2018).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 40-1-117(b) (2019).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4) (2019).
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County. The plaintiff’s complaint asserted that because the accident
happened in Bibb County, venue was proper in Bibb County under the
Georgia Motor Carrier Act. Dirt Movers filed a notice of removal to Jeff
Davis County based on the Georgia Business Corporation Code. The
trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to remand the case back to Bibb
County, but granted the plaintiff a certificate of immediate review. 7
On review, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted that the Georgia
Business Corporation Code’s venue provision limits a corporate
defendant’s right of removal to those cases where venue is based solely
on O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4), which provides:
In actions for damages because of torts, wrong, or injury done, in the
county where the cause of action originated. If venue is based solely
on this paragraph, the defendant shall have the right to remove the
action to the county in Georgia where the defendant maintains its
principal place of business.8

“Therefore, under the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4), a
corporation cannot remove an action to the county where its principal
place of business is located if there is any basis for venue other than
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4).”9 Here, although the plaintiff filed the action
in the county where the cause of action arose, she based venue on the
provisions of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-117(b), not solely on the similar grounds
in O.C.G.A. § 14-2-510(b)(4).10 Because O.C.G.A. § 40-1-117(b) provided
an independent basis for venue in Bibb County, the court held that
venue was proper in Bibb County and the defendant could not remove
the case to Jeff Davis County.11
B. Direct Actions Against Motor Carriers’ Insurers
The appellate courts rendered two important decisions in this survey
period interpreting Georgia’s direct-action statutes, O.C.G.A.
§§ 40-1-11212 and 40-2-140,13 which permit the plaintiff to name a motor
carrier’s insurance provider as a defendant in an action against the
motor carrier.14
7. Blakemore, 344 Ga. App. at 238–39, 809 S.E.2d at 828–29.
8. Id. at 240, 809 S.E.2d at 829 (emphasis omitted).
9. Id. at 241–42, 809 S.E.2d at 830.
10. Id. at 242, 809 S.E.2d at 830–31.
11. Id. at 243, 809 S.E.2d at 831.
12. O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112 (2019).
13. O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140 (2019).
14. See RLI Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 345 Ga. App. 876, 815 S.E.2d 558 (2018); see also Reis
v. OOIDA Risk Retention Grp., Inc., 303 Ga. 659, 814 S.E.2d 338 (2018).
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In RLI Insurance Company v. Duncan,15 the Georgia Court of
Appeals considered whether a motor carrier’s excess insurance carrier
could be named as a defendant under the direct-action statutes.
Following a motor vehicle accident involving a tractor-trailer, the
plaintiff sued the truck driver, the trucking company, and the trucking
company’s insurer, RLI Insurance Company. The defendant trucking
company was self-insured up to $750,000 but failed to register as
self-insured. RLI Insurance filed a motion to dismiss, claiming it was an
excess carrier and, therefore, should be dismissed. The trial court
denied RLI’s motion to dismiss because the defendant trucking
company failed to register itself as self-insured and because, having
issued the trucking company a surety bond, RLI was the company’s
primary insurer.16 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed on
interlocutory appeal.17
The court of appeals noted the existence of a long line of cases
holding that the direct-action statutes do not authorize actions against
an insured’s excess insurer.18 Because statutes permitting a direct
action against an insurance carrier are in derogation of the common
law, the terms of those statutes are strictly construed. 19 Also, O.C.G.A.
§ 40-1-112(b) allows a motor carrier to self-insure in lieu of obtaining an
indemnity policy when the financial ability of the motor carrier
warrants.20 Even though the trucking company failed to register as
self-insured, the court determined that the terms of the RLI insurance
policy still only required RLI to pay for damages in excess of the
trucking company’s self-insured limits, so RLI only provided excess
insurance and could not be added as a named defendant to the
lawsuit.21
Finally, the Georgia Supreme Court considered whether provisions of
the federal Liability Risk Retention Act (LRRA) 22 preempted Georgia’s
direct-action statutes so as to prevent risk retention groups from being
named as parties in actions against their insureds. 23 The defendant
motor carrier in Reis v. OOIDA Risk Retention Group, Inc. was insured
through OOIDA, a foreign liability risk retention group created

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

345 Ga. App. 876, 815 S.E.2d 558 (2018).
Id. at 876–77, 815 S.E.2d at 559–60.
Id.
Id. at 878, 815 S.E.2d at 560.
Id.
Id. at 879, 815 S.E.2d at 561.
Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 3901–3906 (2019).
Reis, 303 Ga. 659, 814 S.E.2d 338.
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pursuant to the guidelines of the LRRA. The plaintiffs filed their
lawsuit against the defendant driver, the corporate motor carrier, and
OOIDA as the motor carrier’s insurer. OOIDA filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing the direct-action statutes did not apply for
two reasons. First, OOIDA argued the direct-action statutes did not
contemplate suits against risk retention groups. Second, OOIDA argued
the LRRA preempted Georgia’s direct-action statutes.24
The trial court concluded that the LRRA preempted the direct-action
statutes and, therefore, OOIDA could not be named as a defendant. 25
The Georgia Supreme Court agreed.26 The court explained that the
federal legislation authorizing the creation of risk retention groups, 15
U.S.C. § 3902(a)(1), specifically states that “a risk retention group is
exempt from any State law . . . to the extent that such law . . . would
make unlawful, or regulate, directly or indirectly, the operation of a risk
retention group . . . .”27 Essentially, the LRRA provides that risk
retention groups are exempt from state laws relating to the operation of
the risk retention groups.28 States are specifically allowed to enforce
their own financial-responsibility laws on out-of-state risk retention
groups to demand financial soundness or solvency, and the plaintiffs
urged
that
the
direct-action
statutes
are
essentially
financial-responsibility laws.29 The supreme court, however, determined
that, because the direct-action statutes would subject foreign risk
retention groups to lawsuits, liability, and damages, they would directly
and indirectly regulate the groups’ operations. 30 Therefore, the directaction statutes are preempted by the LRRA, and risk retention groups
organized through the LRRA cannot be named as direct-action
defendants pursuant to the Georgia Motor Carrier Act. 31
III. AVIATION
The general landscape of aviation law is, for the most part, shaped
and determined by federal regulations 32 and, in some cases,

24. Id. at 660, 814 S.E.2d at 339–40.
25. Id. at 660, 814 S.E.2d at 340.
26. Id. at 659, 814 S.E.2d at 339.
27. Id. at 662, 814 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 3902(a)(1) (2019)).
28. Id. at 662–63, 814 S.E.2d at 341.
29. Id. at 663–64, 814 S.E.2d at 341–42.
30. Id. at 666, 814 S.E.2d at 343.
31. Id.
32. ROBIN C. LARNER, 15 GA. JUR. § 29:25 (2019) (“Federal aviation regulations have
been promulgated to regulate virtually every aspect of aviation in the United States;
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international treaties.33 In fact, the stated intention of Georgia’s
aviation statutes is “to coincide with the policies, principles, and
practices established by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and all
amendments thereto.”34 As a result, federal courts determine much of
the case law regulating commercial aviation,35 as further reflected by
the recent Georgia cases discussed below. However, developments in
legislation have begun to shape the legal aviation landscape in Georgia.
A. Case Law
In Avery v. Paulding County Airport Authority,36 the Georgia Court of
Appeals
addressed
four
appeals
from
three
related
declaratory-judgment actions concerning commercial aviation. 37 The
appeals all pertained to the Paulding County Airport Authority (PCAA)
and its actions related to applying for a commercial “Airport Operating
Certificate,” one of the many requirements for commercial aviation
imposed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Each of the
underlying declaratory-judgment actions sought clarification as to
whether the PCAA was authorized to submit the application to the FAA
and whether consent from Paulding County was required to submit that
application. The actions also challenged whether the PCAA had

these regulations are duly published in accordance with law in the Code of Federal
Regulations, and they have the force of law.”).
33. A United Nations treaty, the Montreal Convention, sets forth uniform rules for
claims that arise out of incidents that occur during international air transportation. See
Marotte v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 296 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Warsaw
Convention is the exclusive mechanism of recovery for personal injuries suffered on board
an aircraft or in the course of embarking or disembarking from an airplane.”); Ugaz v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“The Montreal Convention
entered into force in the United States on November 4, 2003 and superseded [sic] the
Warsaw Convention.”).
34. O.C.G.A. § 6-2-1 (2019).
35. Georgia courts do, however, routinely analyze and consider federal aviation
regulations when addressing aviation-related issues under state law. See, e.g., Eagle Jets,
LLC v. Atlanta Jet, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 386, 740 S.E.2d 439 (2013) (discussing whether the
Certificate of Aircraft Registration required by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) constituted ownership of the aircraft for purposes of a contract dispute); Sky King
101, LLC v. Thurmond, 314 Ga. App. 377, 724 S.E.2d 412 (2012) (addressing FAA flight
procedures and regulations followed by pilots when analyzing whether defendant air
transportation company had “control” over a co-pilot sufficient to be considered his
employer).
36. 343 Ga. App. 832, 808 S.E.2d 15 (2017).
37. Id. at 832, 808 S.E.2d at 17.
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complied with the Georgia Open Meetings Act 38 in taking steps to
obtain the certification.39
The issues raised by the cases below significantly touched on
commercial aviation, as both taxpayers and Paulding County argued
that the PCAA’s application to the FAA would “obligate the County in
numerous respects to the funding and operation of a commercial
airport.”40 Paulding County argued, inter alia, that it had “final
decision-making authority on whether to seek a change in the scope of
aviation services offered” and that PCAA lacked authority to seek the
operating certificate from the FAA without approval and support from
the county.41 However, all four appeals resulted from a dismissal by the
trial court for failure to state a claim, rather than a decision directly
analyzing the parties’ obligations related to the FAA certification. 42
Specifically, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the taxpayers’
action alleging the PCAA violated the Open Meetings Act when making
decisions related to the FAA application was not time-barred under
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(b)(2),43 and that the trial court erred in dismissing
their claim on this basis.44 However, the court of appeals held that the
trial court properly dismissed the taxpayers’ action seeking a
declaratory judgment that the PCAA was not authorized to submit an
application to the FAA on behalf of Paulding County, as they failed to
“allege any uncertainty or insecurity as to their rights, status, or legal
relations” in order to establish an “actual controversy” entitling them to
declaratory relief.45
Contrastingly, as to Paulding County’s action seeking a similar
declaration, that the PCAA lacked the authority to submit an
application to the FAA to change the nature and scope of services at the
airport, the appellate court held that the county’s allegations
sufficiently demonstrated an actual controversy for which declaratory
relief is appropriate.46 Essentially, the court of appeals held that
Paulding County was in a different position than the taxpayers in that
there was a dispute between Paulding County and the PCAA relating to

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 (2019).
Avery, 343 Ga. App. at 832, 834, 808 S.E.2d at 17–18.
Id. at 834, 808 S.E.2d at 19.
Id. at 837–38, 808 S.E.2d at 21.
Id. at 832, 808 S.E.2d at 18.
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(b)(2) (2019).
Avery, 343 Ga. App. at 841, 808 S.E.2d at 23.
Id. at 844–45, 808 S.E.2d at 24–25.
Id. at 845–46, 808 S.E.2d at 25–26.
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their rights to submit and approve the FAA application. 47 Finally, the
court of appeals determined that a private operator that had entered an
agreement to be responsible for the commercial aviation and related
development at the airport, like the taxpayers, had failed to establish a
case or controversy sufficient to support a declaratory judgment action,
in part because the private operator was not party to the dispute
between Paulding County and the PCAA and the related authority to
deal with the FAA regarding the airport’s application. 48 While the court
of appeals’ opinion ultimately dealt with the issues raised by the trial
court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim and did not significantly
affect commercial aviation law, it nevertheless is a useful illustration of
the complexities of the aviation legal landscape.
B. Legislation
As referenced in the 2017 edition of this survey, 49 the Georgia
General Assembly amended Georgia’s statutory tort law to facilitate
space flight activity and to limit the liability of space flight entities for
injuries sustained by participants.50 Effective July 1, 2017, the new
statutory provisions define related terms 51 and provide that any
litigation or proceeding against a space flight entity pertaining to space
flight activities will be governed by Georgia law. 52 The statutory
language defines “space flight entity” expansively and includes the
following: persons conducting space flight activities and licensed as
necessary by the FAA and the state of Georgia; manufacturers or
suppliers of component parts of vehicles used in space flight activities;
employees, officers, directors, owners, stockholders, members,
managers, advisors, or partners of the entity, manufacturer, or
supplier; owners or lessors of the real property on which space flight
activities are conducted; and any state agency or local governmental
unit having a contractual relationship with these entities or having
jurisdiction in the territory in which space flight activities are
conducted.53 Space flight entities will not be civilly or criminally liable
for a participant’s injury arising out of the “inherent risks associated
with any space flight activities,” provided that the participant
47. Id. at 847, 808 S.E.2d at 27.
48. Id. at 848, 850, 808 S.E.2d at 27–28.
49. Lowry et al., supra note 1, at 50–51.
50. Ga. H.R. Bill 1, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 172 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 51-3-41–
51-3-44 (2019)).
51. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-41 (2019).
52. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-44 (2019).
53. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-41(a)(12) (2019).
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previously signed a statutorily specified “warning and agreement.” 54
The liability limitation does not apply to intentional acts or acts of gross
negligence that proximately caused the injury, nor does it apply to
breaches of contracts related to the use of real property or enforcement
actions brought by the state or federal government.55
The General Assembly’s legislation pertaining to unmanned aircraft
systems, or drones, also went into effect as of July 1, 2017. 56 Pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 6-1-4(a), an “unmanned aircraft system” is defined as a
“powered, aerial vehicle” that does not carry a human operator, does not
require operation by a human from within or on the aircraft, can fly
autonomously or be piloted remotely, and can be expendable or
recoverable.57 The new code section permits state agencies, counties,
municipalities, and other political subdivisions to adopt an ordinance
that authorizes or prohibits the launch or intentional landing of an
unmanned aircraft system from or on their public property. 58 Counties,
municipalities, and other political subdivisions of the state are not
authorized, however, to adopt ordinances to provide or prohibit the
launch or landing of drones on their property “with respect to the
operation of an unmanned aircraft system for commercial purposes.” 59
The new code section also prevents counties, municipalities, and other
political subdivisions from regulating the testing or operation of drones,
except to the extent the regulations enforce ordinances in effect before
April 1, 2017, or adopt FAA restrictions.60
Finally, while not having the force of statutory or case law, Georgia
Senate Resolution No. 296, filed March 5, 2019, recognized and
commended the Georgia aerospace industry for “its significant
beneficial impact to the people and economy of the State of Georgia,”
noting that the aerospace industry comprises 800 companies employing
108,000 Georgians and has an economic impact of $57.5 billion. 61 The
resolution demonstrates commercial aviation’s significant presence in
Georgia and how that presence may continue to affect Georgia law and
legislation.
54. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-42(a) (2019) (providing for limitations of liability of space flight
entities); O.C.G.A. § 51-3-43 (2019) (specifying the language required for a valid warning
and agreement sufficient to limit a space flight entity’s liability).
55. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-42(b) (2019).
56. Ga. H.R. Bill 481, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 268 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 6-1-4
(2017)); see Lowry et al., supra note 1, at 51–52.
57. O.C.G.A § 6-1-4(a) (2019).
58. O.C.G.A. § 6-1-4(b)–(c) (2019).
59. O.C.G.A. § 6-1-4(b).
60. Id.
61. Ga. S. Res. 296, Reg. Sess. (2019).
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IV. RAILROADS
As noted by the Georgia Court of Appeals, “Railroads are among the
most heavily regulated American industries.” 62 Federal legislation, such
as the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 63 comprises the vast
majority of this regulation.64 Moreover, any additional or more
stringent state or local law or regulation related to railroad safety or
security will typically be preempted by federal law. 65 Accordingly, the
General Assembly has not enacted recent legislation that regulates
commercial rail transportation. However, a recent Georgia case that
touches upon railroads and the commercial-rail industry demonstrates
the interplay between federal regulations and preemption, while
highlighting those areas still decided by state law.
In Fox v. Norfolk Southern Corp.,66 a landowner (Fox) asserted claims
against Norfolk Southern Corporation and Norfolk Southern Railway
Company (collectively referred to herein as Norfolk Southern) for
inverse condemnation and trespass related to a 100-foot wide
right-of-way owned by Norfolk Southern. Specifically, Fox owned 160
acres in Gordon County that were bisected by active railroad tracks
operated by Norfolk Southern. To access portions of his land, Fox had to
travel over the tracks via a private railroad crossing.67
In 2007, Norfolk Southern developed plans to construct a new
passing side track, which would necessitate an additional forty feet of
width to the existing right-of-way. Fox declined to sell the additional
portions of his land unless Norfolk Southern would guarantee that it
would not block his private railroad crossing for more than thirty
minutes at a time. Rather than make the guarantee and purchase
additional land, Norfolk Southern altered its plans to fit the passing
track within the existing, 100-foot wide right-of-way. Following the
construction, Fox alleged that trains now blocked his private crossing
for up to twenty-four hours at a time, preventing him from using a
portion of his land. Fox also alleged the original deed and the pattern of
use of the right-of-way was for only forty-five feet and, therefore, the

62. Midville River Tract, LLC v. Cent. of Ga. R.R. Co., 339 Ga. App. 546, 548, 794
S.E.2d 192, 194 (2016) (quoting Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 F.3d 170, 174 (3d
Cir. 2013)).
63. 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101–168 (2019).
64. See Midville River Tract, 339 Ga. App. at 548, 794 S.E.2d at 194.
65. Id. (citing FRSA, 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2) (2019)).
66. 342 Ga. App. 38, 802 S.E.2d 319 (2017).
67. Id. at 38–40, 802 S.E.2d at 322–23.
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new construction of passing track that extended past this distance
amounted to inverse condemnation of his land.68
Demonstrating the interplay between federal regulations and statelevel commercial railroad disputes, Norfolk Southern asserted that
Fox’s claims were preempted by federal law under the Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA) 69 and
removed the case to federal court.70 ICCTA provides that the Surface
Transportation Board (STB) has exclusive jurisdiction over legal
remedies related to “the construction, acquisition, operation,
abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or
side tracks . . . .”71 However, the federal district court determined that
Fox’s claims for the taking of his property and required compensation
were not preempted because “the issue of whether [the Railroad]
wrongfully took [Fox’s] property does not relate to the regulation of the
Railroad or affect the operation and use of the Railroad.” 72 Noting that
Norfolk Southern could still operate the side track, and would only have
to compensate Fox, the federal court remanded Fox’s claims to state
court.73 After remand, the state court determined that Fox could not
prevail on his claims because Norfolk Southern’s construction remained
within the 100-foot right-of-way and because his claims were preempted
by ICCTA.74 Fox appealed from the grant of summary judgment to
Norfolk Southern.75
As to the parties’ dispute as to the width of the original right-of-way,
the court of appeals held that Fox’s claims were foreclosed by O.C.G.A.
§ 46-8-100,76 a statute enacted in 2008 which provided that any
disputes related to the acquisition by a railroad company of property
that occurred prior to 1913 would be conclusively determined on the
official maps the railroad filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission pursuant to the Railroad Valuation Act of March 1, 1913. 77
As the map clearly reflected a 100-foot right-of-way, the court of appeals
rejected Fox’s claims for taking related to his property falling within

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 40–41, 802 S.E.2d at 324.
49 U.S.C. § 10101–62 (2019).
Fox, 342 Ga. App. at 41, 802 S.E.2d at 324.
49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2) (2019).
Fox, 342 Ga. App. at 42, 802 S.E.2d at 324.
Id.
Id. at 42, 802 S.E.2d at 324–25.
Id. at 42–43, 802 S.E.2d at 325.
O.C.G.A. § 46-8-100 (2019).
Fox, 342 Ga. App. at 46–47, 802 S.E.2d at 327–28.
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that area.78 The court also rejected Fox’s claims that Norfolk Southern
had admitted it only had a 45-foot right-of-way in discovery and that, in
any case, he had adversely possessed the remainder of the 100-foot
right-of-way.79
However, the Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial
court’s determination that Fox’s claims as to the portion of his land on
the other side of the tracks were preempted by ICCTA. 80 First, the court
noted that whether the STB has exclusive jurisdiction by operation of
ICCTA is informed by STB decisions regarding preemption.81
Specifically, the STB set forth a framework for analyzing potential
preemption issues by state and local laws or claims, depending on
whether the preemption was categorical or as applied. 82 Noting, inter
alia, that Fox’s claims involved a “traditional state law cause of
action . . . not directed . . . at railroads or their property,” the court of
appeals determined that the dispute fell within the “as applied”
analysis.83 Accordingly, the court analyzed whether Fox’s claims “would
have the effect of unreasonably burdening or interfering with rail
transportation.”84
Determining that Norfolk Southern had not offered any argument or
evidence that Fox’s claims would burden rail transportation, the court
of appeals determined that Fox’s claims were not preempted by
ICCTA.85 Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary
judgment as to Fox’s inverse condemnation claims for the portion of his
land on the other side of the tracks. 86
The Fox decision demonstrates, once again, that litigation against a
railroad company, and evaluation of federal preemption issues, will
typically be highly fact-specific and turn on the specific issue addressed
by a federal regulation and the specific allegations made in the state
action.

78. Id. at 48, 802 S.E.2d at 328.
79. Id. at 48–50, 802 S.E.2d at 329.
80. Id. at 52, 802 S.E.2d at 331.
81. Id. at 55, 802 S.E.2d at 333.
82. See CSX Transp., Inc.–Pet. for Decl. Order, S.T.B. Finance Docket No. 34662,
2005 STB LEXIS 675, at *2–3 (S.T.B. May 3, 2005); see also Wedemeyer v. CSX Transp.,
850 F.3d 889, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2017) (describing the STB’s preemption analysis).
83. Fox, 342 Ga. App. at 56–57, 802 S.E.2d at 334.
84. Id. at 57, 802 S.E.2d at 334.
85. Id. at 57–58, 60, 802 S.E.2d at 334–36.
86. Id. at 60, 802 S.E.2d at 836.

[3] COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/26/2019 10:57 AM

COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION

51

V. SHAREABLE, DOCKLESS MOBILITY-DEVICE RENTALS
The sight of electric bicycles and electric scooters cruising through
large cities and college towns has become increasingly common in the
past few years, as Silicon Valley companies such as Bird, Lime, and
Spin have moved quickly to “disrupt” the industry of bicycle and
mobility-device rentals.87 As these bikeshare and scooter-share services
grow in popularity, lawmakers are struggling to keep up.
These companies operate by leaving shareable, dockless electric
bicycles and scooters unattended on the street and connecting them to
the internet.88 A customer who comes across one of the devices can rent
it via a smartphone app, then leave it wherever the customer finishes
using it.89 The companies engage individuals in the various towns to
collect and charge the devices, and some companies engage other local
individuals to perform inspections, maintenance, and repairs. 90 The
sudden profusion of these devices on city streets and sidewalks raises a
number of safety concerns. For example, users may not know whether
to drive scooters on sidewalks, in bike lanes, or in travel lanes; they
likely do not have helmets or other protective equipment with them;
and the companies may vary in how thoroughly the bikes and scooters
are inspected and maintained.91 These and other emerging safety

87. See, e.g., Megan Rose Dickey, Ford-Owned Spin Will Bring Electric Scooters to
100 New Cities and College Campuses This Year, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/19/ford-owned-spin-will-launch-electric-scooters-in-100new-cities-this-year/; Lora Kolodny, LimeBike Raises $12 Million to Roll Out Bike
Sharing
Without
Kiosks
in
the
US,
TECHCRUNCH
(Mar.
15,
2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/15/limebike-raises-12-million-to-roll-out-bike-sharingwithout-kiosks-in-the-us/; Press Release, Bird Marks One Year Anniversary With 10
Millionth
Environmentally-Friendly
Ride,
BIRD
(Sept.
20,
2018),
https://www.bird.co/press/bird-marks-one-year-anniversary-with-10-millionthenvironmentally-friendly-ride/.
88. Umair Irfan, Electric Scooters’ Sudden Invasion of American Cities, Explained,
VOX (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/27/17676670/electric-scooter-rental-birdlime-skip-spin-cities.
89. Id.
90. Thomas Wheatley, Bird Invasion: Atlanta’s Electric Scooters Are Fun, Dangerous,
Exciting, Annoying, and Unstoppable, ATLANTA MAGAZINE (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.atlantamagazine.com/news-culture-articles/bird-invasion-atlantas-electricscooters-are-fun-dangerous-exciting-annoying-and-unstoppable/; Harry Campbell, Bird
Mechanic Review: What It’s Like to Fix Bird Scooters, THE RIDESHARE GUY (July 20,
2018), https://therideshareguy.com/how-to-become-bird-mechanic.
91. For more on potential hazards associated with rentals of shareable dockless
mobility devices, questions about applicability of insurance policies, and other concerns
for tort litigators, see Madeline E. McNeeley, Electric Bicycle and Scooter Rental
Litigation, VERDICT: J. GA. TRIAL LAW. ASS’N (forthcoming Fall 2019).

[3] COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

52

MERCER LAW REVIEW

11/26/2019 10:57 AM

[Vol. 71

concerns are likely to be the source of new legislation, personal-injury
lawsuits, or both in the coming months and years.
At the state level, the Georgia General Assembly took a first step
toward addressing some of these issues during the 2019 legislative
session with the passage of House Bill 454. 92 The bill was signed by the
governor on April 26, 2019, and was slated to go into effect on July 1,
2019.93 HB 454 speaks to the use of electric bicycles and electric
personal assistive mobility devices (EPAMDs), 94 such as electric
scooters and Segway PTs, on bike paths, but otherwise addresses only a
selection of safety issues surrounding electric bicycles. 95
Pursuant to HB 454, the Georgia Code now groups electric bicycles
into three classes according to their top speeds and the manner in
which their motors operate,96 and it requires that each electric bicycle
have its class, top speed, and motor wattage prominently displayed. 97
Electric bicycles must have the same equipment as ordinary bicycles, as
well as the capability of disengaging the motor when the operator stops
pedaling or applies the brakes and, in the case of Class III devices
(those with top speeds of twenty-eight miles per hour), a speedometer.98
The new law also clarifies that persons operating electric-assisted
bicycles are subject to all the same rights and duties as operators of
ordinary bicycles.99 Class I and II electric-assisted bicycles, as well as
EPAMDs, may operate on bicycle paths, but Class III electric-assisted
bicycles may not.100 Local authorities and state agencies are authorized
to make exceptions regarding electric bicycles within their

92. Ga. H.R. Bill 454, Reg. Sess., 2019 Ga. Laws 56 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 12-3-114
(2019) and in scattered sections of tit. 40).
93. Id.
94. The statute provides:
“Electric personal assistive mobility device” or “EPAMD” means a
self-balancing, two nontandem wheeled device designed to transport only one
person and having an electric propulsion system with average power of 750
watts (1 horsepower) and a maximum speed of less than 20 miles per hour on a
paved level surface when powered solely by such propulsion system and ridden
by an operator who weighs 170 pounds.
O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(15.4) (2019).
95. Id.
96. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-300 (2019); see O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(15.3), (30), (33) (2019) (refining
the definition of electric assisted bicycle).
97. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-302(a) (2019).
98. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-302(c)–(d) (2019).
99. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-301 (2019).
100. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-303(a)(1)–(2) (2019); see O.C.G.A. § 12-3-114(1)(B), (G) (2019)
(providing that only motorized transportation capable of traveling over 20 miles per hour
is excluded from urban bike trails); O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(6.1)–(6.2) (2019).
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jurisdictions.101 The law regarding use of bike paths does not apply to
natural-surface bike trails, which remain regulated solely by the
authorities or agencies with jurisdiction over them.102
Persons under age 15 are prohibited from operating Class III electric
bicycles, and no one of any age may operate or be a passenger on a
Class III bicycle without wearing a helmet.103 Importantly for the
bikeshare industry, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-303(c)(2)104 provides that Class III
electric-assisted bicycles may not be rented or leased to any person
without an accompanying helmet unless the customer is already in
possession of a helmet.105 The helmet provisions do not apply to Class I
and II electric bicycles.106 Tort lawyers should note that “[v]iolation of
any provision of th[e] subsection” on helmets, § 40-6-303(c), expressly
“shall not constitute negligence per se nor contributory negligence per
se or be considered evidence of negligence or liability.”107
As of this writing, whether and how to address other safety concerns
around electric bicycle and, especially, electric scooter rentals, what
permitting requirements to put into place, and how to manage sidewalk
and road usage is largely a matter for local governments. Some Georgia
communities, such as Athens and Savannah, joined cities like San
Francisco and Nashville in banning the rentals altogether, either
permanently or until they could enact satisfactory ordinances.108 Other
cities, including Atlanta, allowed the devices to proliferate while they
deliberated and enacted new regulatory schemes. 109 A comprehensive
look at municipal ordinances is beyond the scope of this Survey, but tort

101. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-303(a)(1)–(2).
102. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-303(a)(3) (2019).
103. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-303(b)–(c)(1) (2019).
104. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-303(c)(2) (2019).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-303(c)(5) (2019).
108. Wheatley, supra note 90; Lee Shearer, Athens-Clarke Commission Grounds Bird
Scooters,
ATHENS
BANNER-HERALD
(Dec.
5,
2018),
https://www.onlineathens.com/news/20181205/athens-clarke-commission-grounds-birdscooters; Lee Shearer, Athens-Clarke County Weighs Options to Deal With Bird Scooters,
ATHENS
BANNER-HERALD
(Oct.
19,
2018),
https://www.onlineathens.com/news/20181019/athens-clarke-county-weighs-options-todeal-with-bird-scooters.
109. Wheatley, supra note 90. The Atlanta City Council adopted Ordinance 18-O-1322
on January 7, 2019. Atlanta City Council Ordinance No. 18-O-1322, available at
https://www.atlantaga.gov/home/showdocument?id=39601; Shareable Dockless Mobility
Devices,
CITY
OF
ATLANTA,
GA,
https://www.atlantaga.gov/government/departments/shareable-dockless-mobility-devices
(last visited July 21, 2019).
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lawyers and others with an interest in this area should be sure to
review local laws and regulations closely if they encounter an issue
involving an electric bicycle or EPAMD.
VI. TRANSPORTATION FOR HIRE—TAXICABS, LIMOUSINES, AND
RIDESHARE SERVICES
No legal developments occurred during this survey period that bear
directly on the provision of taxi, limousine, or other livery services. A
case from the Georgia Court of Appeals, however, did consider for the
first time the definition of the term “public or livery conveyance” that
often appears in coverage exclusions in individual automobile-insurance
policies.110
The plaintiff in Haulers Insurance Co. v. Davenport111 was in a wreck
while giving his neighbor a ride into town. 112 He sued the at-fault driver
and served his own uninsured-motorist (UM) carrier, but the UM
carrier denied coverage, claiming that his policy excluded coverage for
damages and injuries incurred when the vehicle was “being used as a
public or livery conveyance.”113 The evidence showed that the plaintiff
sometimes drove this neighbor three miles into town, for which she
would pay him about seven dollars. On the day in question, the plaintiff
saw his neighbor walking into town and gratuitously offered her a ride,
which she accepted. She never paid him for that ride, although she later
testified that she had expected to do so. He did not offer paid rides to
the general public.114
The court of appeals noted that because the term “public or livery
conveyance” was not defined in the policy, it must be given its common
and ordinary meaning.115 “Public” refers to something that affects all
people or is accessible by all members of the community, and “livery”
refers to a “business that rents vehicles.”116 Dicta in a prior Georgia
Supreme Court case had suggested that “public livery conveyance”
indicates a taxicab, and a Georgia Court of Appeals case from the 1950s
held an agreement to pay for gasoline did not convert the loan of a
personal vehicle into a livery conveyance.117 Moreover, several other
states’ courts held that a vehicle must be held out indiscriminately to
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Haulers Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 344 Ga. 444, 810 S.E.2d 617 (2018).
344 Ga. 444, 810 S.E.2d 617 (2018).
Id. at 444, 810 S.E.2d at 618.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 446, 810 S.E.2d at 619.
Id.
Id.

[3] COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION

11/26/2019 10:57 AM

55

the general public for hire in order to qualify as a “public or livery
conveyance.”118 In light of these precedents, the court in Davenport
adopted the other states’ definition and held that this plaintiff’s
occasional transport of a specific neighbor for a fee did not rise to the
level of either holding his services out indiscriminately to the public or
operating a business for hire.119 Therefore, the coverage exclusion did
not apply.120 While the Davenport case does not change the scope of
insurance coverage for those who actually are engaged in providing
transportation for hire, it offers useful clarification in this time of
increasing pervasiveness of ridesharing services that some boundaries
still exist, and individuals can still carpool or offer a ride in exchange
for gas money without being deemed livery drivers and losing the
benefit of their insurance coverage.
VII. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY
The Georgia General Assembly enacted a regime in 2017 to allow for
testing and operating autonomous vehicles (or “self-driving cars”) on
public roads.121 In particular, as readers of the 2017 Georgia Survey will
recall, O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11122 sets forth certain minimum safety and
insurance standards for an automated vehicle to be allowed to operate
on the roads without a human driver.123 During the 2018 legislative
session, O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11 was amended to state that none of those
minimum standards “shall be construed to limit the applicability of
state consumer protection laws,”124 such as the Fair Business Practices
Act of 1975,125 the Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, 126
and the Georgia Lemon Law.127 This brief but important clarification
confirms that these new technologies must adhere to existing consumerprotection laws as they develop and that Georgians’ rights and
protections are not to be sacrificed in the name of progress.

118. Id. at 446, 810 S.E.2d at 619–20.
119. Id. at 447–48, 810 S.E.2d at 620.
120. Id. at 448, 810 S.E.2d at 620.
121. Ga. S. Bill 219, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 214 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of tit. 40); Lowry et al., supra note 1, at 56.
122. O.C.G.A § 40-8-11 (2019).
123. Lowry et al., supra note 1, at 56–57.
124. Ga. H.R. Bill 717, 2018 Ga. Laws 331 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11(d) (2019)).
125. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-390–10-1-407 (2019).
126. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-620–10-1-670 (2019).
127. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-780–10-1-798 (2019).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
As this Article illustrates, commercial transportation law involves an
often complex interaction of state and federal law, despite that each
major area tends to be regulated primarily at one level or the other.
Efforts to adapt the law to the fast-changing business and technological
landscape further complicate this picture. Successfully navigating these
issues requires a thorough understanding of laws and regulations at the
federal, state, and even local levels and how they all interact with each
other.

